The Armtimes website, which belongs to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s family, citing its reliable source, has published an article titled “What Russia Wants: For the Information of His Holiness the Catholicos, the Three Presidents and the Expert Community,” in which it explains what Russia wants from Armenia.
“In our region, Russia’s desires are placed within the chain of its global desires, and Armenia and Karabakh are one link in that chain of desires.
Russia wants from Armenia almost what it wants from Ukraine: that it become part of the ‘Russia-Belarus’ union state or of Russia. And if in the case of Ukraine, the RF uses Russian and perhaps Belarusian troops for such an outcome, in the case of Armenia it uses Azerbaijani and, to some extent, the Russian troops stationed in the RA.
The meaning of the actions is the following: to show Armenia’s security vulnerability, so that the latter applies at the earliest moment to become part of the ‘Russia-Belarus’ union state. The steps to develop this logic are Azerbaijan’s aggressiveness (offensiveness), the inertia (inaction) of the Russian troops stationed in the RA, Russia’s political inertia, and the failure to fulfil the obligations to supply arms to Armenia. The use of the latter tool is not accidental and has been used before, for example, before and after the 2016 war. Armenia must be as vulnerable as possible so that it embraces Russia as tightly as possible.
The Karabakh case also fits into this logic, with a certain difference. Russia needs the non-resolution of the NK issue, that is, that the NK issue remain unresolved, as a lever of influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This desire has been the cornerstone of the status quo established for decades in the zone of the NK conflict, and it is on this cornerstone that Armenia’s policy of continuing the negotiations endlessly has been made possible. This continued until 2011, after which, step by step, Russia has come to the necessity of changing the status quo.
The RF reached this conclusion not because it now wants the settlement of the NK issue, but because it has begun to understand that it cannot maintain the status quo. One of the key reasons is Turkey’s growing role and, at a time of an already irreversible clash with the West, the importance for Russia of Turkey’s more or less balanced position. This is where the cause of the 44-day war must be sought.
Also, in conditions of a foreseeable or planned clash with the West, when obviously the Western transport (transit) routes would be closed, or at least called into question, it was extremely important for Russia to ensure the more or less normal functioning of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits for itself (otherwise the Black Sea would become an ordinary lake for the RF), as well as to ensure a land connection to the West through Turkey.
The RF-Georgia-Turkey route would not solve the problem of new land flows; because of the conflicts (clashes) in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the roads passing through them would not be opened. And the Verkhny Lars checkpoint was already working overloaded even before the Ukrainian conflict (confrontation).
And therefore, the means of effectively solving this issue was to be the use of the Armenia-Azerbaijan axis.
This is the reason that the Lavrov plan for the NK issue provided for the handover of the southern regions to Azerbaijan, so that the route of the Ordubad-Meghri-Horadiz railway and highways would be freed from obstacles.
In this sense, despite public statements, Russia is the main beneficiary of a corridor through the RA territory, because Azerbaijan, Turkey and Russia all want there to be a corridor through the RA territory under RF control. The last factor is essential, because there is also a road through Iran’s territory. A railway can also be built through Iran.
The not-so-successful course of affairs in Ukraine has essentially further sharpened the situation established after 2011, that Russia now finds it difficult to be the guarantor of the status quo established after 2020; Khtsaberd and Parukh are vivid evidence of this.
The role of Turkey and Azerbaijan has increased further, and now Azerbaijan can become a platform for the export of gas and oil from the RF to the EU.
Reliable Source.”
